In age of US-China rivalry, supply chain statecraft counts

Geopolitical competition has long been understood in territorial terms. Power was measured by control over land, resources and populations. Rivalry was expressed through military confrontation, alliance formation and the defence of borders. As economic interdependence deepened in the 20th century, globalisation was seen as an arena within which states competed, but not itself the object of competition.

That assumption no longer holds. Increasingly, the infrastructure of globalisation is becoming the central arena in which geopolitical rivalry unfolds.

Power is no longer exercised only through territorial control, but through influence over economic systems. The question is no longer who controls territory, but who controls the flow of economic activity.

This shift has been partly driven by globalisation itself. As production, transport and finance have become more interconnected, vulnerabilities have multiplied. Supply dependencies, network concentration and geographic chokepoints have created new forms of leverage, often less visible than military force, but no less consequential.

What is emerging is a distinct mode of statecraft: supply chain statecraft – the use of economic infrastructure as an instrument of geopolitical strategy.

States do not simply seek to strengthen their position, but to shape the environment in which their rivals operate. Influence is exerted not only by building capacity, but by controlling access, redirecting flows and introducing friction into the networks on which others depend.